

THE WORKING CLASS IN AMERICAN HISTORY

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Against Labor

*How U.S. Employers Organized
to Defeat Union Activism*

Edited by

ROSEMARY FEURER AND
CHAD PEARSON

University of Illinois Press

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In memory of David Montgomery and Jerry Tucker

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37. Adolph Reed, "Nothing Left: The Long Slow Surrender of American Liberals," *Harper's Magazine*, March 2014, 28–36. See also Panitch and Gindin, *Making of Global Capitalism*.

38. Chris Nyland and Kyle Bruce, "Democracy or Séduction? The Demonization of Scientific Management and the Deification of Human Relations," in *The Right and Labor in America: Politics, Ideology, and Imagination*, ed. Nelson Lichtenstein and Elizabeth Tandy Shermer (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), offer an opposing view of Taylorists.


1 Scientific Management, Racist Science, and Race Management

ELIZABETH ESCH AND DAVID ROEDIGER

John R. Commons, the staid liberal reformer who founded academic labor history in the United States, and Ernest Riebe, the fighting cartoonist of the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), doubtless had little in common politically. Commons supported American Federation of Labor-style unionism, worrying when its limited social goals strayed beyond collective bargaining. Riebe offered to IWW publications the adventures of Mr. Block. The Block character was a clueless, conformist antihero whose sufferings resulted from his misplaced faith in the beneficence of capitalists, politicians, and police, a faith that workers would have to shed to make a revolution. And yet Riebe and Commons shared an understanding of the relationship between race and the management of labor, one that seemed crystal clear to them as early-twentieth-century observers of U.S. workplaces. Both Riebe and Commons addressed the significance of belief in racial difference for workers to divide themselves from one another in the name of racial supremacies and the prizes attached to winning the racial competition. In 1907 Commons's *Races and Immigrants in America* argued, well after Frederick Winslow Taylor had marketed scientific management, that U.S. management had shown just one "symptom of originality," namely "playing one race against the other." Six years later Louisiana lumberjacks struggling for a union would laugh bitterly over a Mr. Block strip wonderfully named "He Meets Others." In the strip, a well-dressed manager circulates from one racialized group of workers to another—Anglo-Saxon, Irish, German, Italian, Chinese, Polish, and Black. Drawn to resemble Mr. Block, these various others are played against one another by the manager. The boss threatens and cajoles them to greater competition and exertion by linking appeals to masculinity and

MR. BLOCK

HE MEETS OTHERS



Mr. Block cartoon of 1913 in which a manager pits one racialized worker against another.

fears of joblessness to racial and national divisions. The management-by-race of various European groups exists along a continuum shared by Black and Asian workers but, Riebe shows, the threat of joblessness is coupled with threats of total exclusion where workers of color are concerned. By the last frame, the manager is unworried about unions as he reclines peacefully, having succeeded in getting the various workers to work frantically while swapping racial slurs.¹

This essay is concerned with the role of management in creating, naming, and promoting competition and segregation among workers on the basis of multiple varieties of racial differences in the last decades of the nineteenth century and first decades of the twentieth. In raising the problem of belief in racial difference—especially as it was attributed to skill—for worker solidarity and resistance, it outlines how divide-and-conquer tactics forestalled solidarity.

Managers, so central to the racial functioning of the workplace in the narratives offered by Commons and Riebe, appear too episodically in accounts of the history of White supremacy and class in U.S. history. If we take seriously Marx's observation that capital necessarily implied the capitalist himself, formed into a "personality" opposing and extracting labor, serious study of how race thinking informed the capitalist personalities embodied in various levels of management must occur. Managers, we argue, were never outside the U.S. racial system and in many ways made that system. Further, the degree to which factory management understood itself as possessing racial knowledge links it to, rather than distinguishes it from, the management of work under slavery. For us, the separation of slavery from the mainstream of both labor and economic history leads to impoverished accounts that suppose there was no sustained literature on the management of labor until the 1880s. Yet the outpouring of antebellum studies on managing slaves, and even on managing slaves "scientifically," reveals how deeply entwined racial and managerial knowledge had already become. However underexplored, links between race and management are profound. Commons's striking connection of the cutting edge of management with the bloody history of race contrasts sharply with the bloodless efficiency of stopwatches and assembly lines that dominate our thinking and that often focused the hopes of progressive reformers like Commons himself, who at another time himself called scientific management "the most productive invention in the history of modern industry."²

Marxists have both participated in and challenged the failure to see the ways race shaped and reflected the managerial personality, which functioned in the workplace as the daily representative of capital. Marx himself, of course, far transcended the racial determinisms of his time, seeing social differences, and not biology, as fundamentally producing racial divisions. Indeed Riebe's

cartoon exemplifies this contribution from the Marxist tradition. Moreover, Marx generated sharp insights into the role of racial slavery in stultifying class consciousness within the White U.S. working class and of anti-Irish animus in dividing British workers. The best accounts of the origins of White supremacy, of the relations of the slave trade and slavery to capitalist development and of race and labor in Reconstruction after the Civil War, come from the Marxist tradition.³

Within the industrial history of the United States, the uneven but significant Marxist influence on labor history has helped make available management's role in structuring the history of race, class, and antiunionism in the United States. At the same time, Marx's classic descriptions of the working day and the labor process tended not to discuss racial division. Within labor history, the work most systematically examining the managerial use of race to divide workers is on the deep and border South in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. When such division is foregrounded, the emphasis is on the role of race in undermining political unity and trade union solidarity, especially during strikes. While these regional and thematic emphases treat important issues, they tend to miss the role of race management in the daily extraction of production.⁴ The two most influential studies of the innovations and peculiarities of U.S. management by Marxists follow the lead of Marx's own writings on the labor market and the labor process in paying scant attention to racial divisions. In the classic Marxist works on management, race is either little present, in the case of Harry Braverman's important work, or transcended definitively by capital, in that of Antonio Gramsci. Even the provocative sections on management in C. L. R. James's *American Civilization* are silent on race.⁵

The most searching critique building on Marxism, but seeking to transcend the tendency of Marxist scholars to divorce labor from the specifically racialized bodies and histories of those performing it, remains the opening chapter of Lisa Lowe's *Immigrant Acts*. Lowe shows the stakes involved in a theoretical challenge to abstractions practiced in the name of materialism and even at times of interracialism. She powerfully demonstrates why Marxism is indispensable for us and why too much of Marxist scholarship has been slow to apprehend the specific history of the United States where race, capital, and class are concerned. Lowe argues that Marxism has too often stopped at allowing for race-making processes like the slave trade and the seizing of native lands only in an early period of primitive accumulation, though race-making continued to matter greatly in the history of capitalism. She insists that in the world's most developed capitalist nation the connection of race and exploitation persisted and ramified, driving the accumulation

of capital and shaping subsequent strategies of rule. "In the history of the United States," Lowe writes, "capital has maximized its profits not through rendering labor 'abstract' but precisely through the social productions of 'difference,' . . . marked by race, nation, geographical origins, and gender." It will not do, of course, to simply turn things over and make management all about race. But Commons was right that race hovered over and permeated the processes through which U.S. labor was chosen and bossed. "Race management" came into being far earlier than scientific management, and the two for a time coexisted as complementary rather than alternative strategies to extract production and profit.⁶ Trade unionists' tendency to choose one of two paths—either race mattered or it did not—often generated inadequate responses to the elaborate and historically rooted system of racial management that complemented the more obvious changes being brought to workplaces by scientific management techniques. Antiunion forces could thus avoid explaining their failures to attack shop-floor reform in the name of protecting the racial interests of those identified with skill and traditional ideas of worker control.

Antiunion references to past practice and tradition thus implicitly but often explicitly naturalized race and racial hierarchies and implied that such structures served workers' interests. While we turn to Commons's formulation as important, we also recognize that, in underplaying the broad connections between racial knowledge and management, he did not offer a clear antiracist analysis for labor historians. Racial competition functioned as one important moment and motive in linking management and race, but the larger idea of a hierarchically understood process of racial development undergirded slavery, settler expansion, and industrial capitalist growth, making the ability to manage other races a distinctly White contribution to civilization.⁷ In our larger study of this vast topic, *The Production of Difference: Race and the Management of Labor in U.S. History*, we begin with the relationships of settler colonialism and especially of slavery to the management of work. A second section details the ways late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century imperialism sent into the world not only capital and soldiers but also U.S. mining engineers and other managers whose claims to expertise turned on their supposed knowledge of race and racial development and their experience with exploiting racial divisions among workers.⁸ In that transnational section of the larger work we are able to demonstrate how such techniques were applied via colonial knowledge and practice, a fact that seems to make their impacts more legible to scholars who do not seem as able to see such dynamics at work in the United States itself. That is where we turn in the third and final section of that study and that we adumbrate here, considering how the most

enlightened U.S. industrial managers countenanced and furthered the playing of races against each other. We deploy the term "race management" in a manner focused on the workplace and the extraction of production, though we acknowledge that race also was inextricably and compellingly connected to the management of resistance and of sexuality. As an examination of the managerial—capitalist—side of the history of racial hierarchy and labor extraction, this essay suggests its importance to studies of union organizing and shop-floor resistance but does not pursue them. Still, race management winds up being a complex term, at some moments simply involving competition among races and at others making claims to know the fitness of certain peoples for certain jobs and to develop "lower" races by fitting them into, and disciplining them through, certain types of labor.⁹

Race management eerily coexisted with scientific management. Even the famous example that Taylor himself used to educate the public about his system's ability to create "high-priced men"—by selecting them studiously and regimenting their motions scientifically—suggests overlap between managerial science and race management. In the example, even as he insisted that the key to effective management was to remake individuals, Taylor chose "Schmidt" as the exemplar of a new regimen for labor. In the movement of an abandoned stock of pig-iron suddenly made valuable by the Spanish-American-Cuban-Philippines War, Taylor urged an almost fourfold increase in productivity and made Schmidt the human face, and pseudonym, for such an advance. In reality, the model worker's name was actually the less stereotypically German "Noll"; the switch reflected a penchant for ethnic typing that elsewhere had Taylor discoursing on the "Patrick" type for Irish American workers. In the famous pig-iron example Taylor adjusted rhetoric and practice with racial attributes in mind. After first experimenting with "large, powerful Hungarians" to affect the speedup, Taylor turned to a racial image of doggedness rather than brute force. The name Schmidt as well as Taylor's description emphasized that the worker's agreement to submit to the new system, in exchange for higher pay, and his ability to produce flowed in part from his membership in the German race. Schmidt embodied the strength, persistence, and love of savings thought by Taylor to be peculiarly concentrated in the Pennsylvania Dutch, as Germans in the area were called.¹⁰

In other ways, too, Taylor engaged race as he revolutionized management. In replying to socialist novelist Upton Sinclair's critique of his celebrated "Principles of Scientific Management" article in 1911, Taylor cast matters globally in a way that suggested familiarity with Herbert Hoover's articles, and ratios, on transnational engineering: "the one element more than any other which differentiates civilized from uncivilized countries . . . is that the

average man in one is five or six times as productive as [in] the other." More incredibly still, Taylor's use of race management found its way, well almost, into the classic work of African American sociology of the early twentieth century, W. E. B. Du Bois's *The Philadelphia Negro*. Du Bois mentions Midvale Steel, test case for the original outdooring of Taylor's managerial techniques, as one rare Philadelphia industrial workplace in which African Americans could work in large numbers at the end of the nineteenth century. Du Bois credited a manager "whom many dubbed a 'crank,'" for the opportunities at Midvale. The sociologist E. Digby Baltzell identified that crank as Taylor in introducing a reissue of Du Bois's classic decades later. The social historians Walter Licht and Jacqueline Jones later added their own brief accounts, emphasizing that Taylor's hatred of ethnic solidarity and of on-the-job drinking at Midvale had led him to introduce African American workers across the plant in a move designed to undermine unity within work gangs and to increase productivity. Apparently even as Midvale workers called him a "nigger driver" for speeding up work, Taylor integrated the labor force significantly. Subsequent managers segregated Midvale, with Black workers who remained all but confined to specific departments.¹¹

Taylor's racial logic in the Schmidt example, and his use of Black workers at Midvale, did not run through the whole of his writing. It is true that, despite his abolitionist upbringing, he occasionally professed a belief in Black inferiority and that he was capable of glorying that when "American" laborers moved up to operate machines, "the dirt handling is done by Italians and Hungarians."¹² But more frequently, his desire to uproot the arbitrary power of foremen and other petty bosses placed Taylor among those management experts whose formal system left the least room for day-to-day uses of stormy racial competition to extract production by playing races against each other. He more and more marketed his management style as based on scientific expertise in manipulating processes and not racialized bodies.¹³ But more broadly, the race thinking that informed Taylor's presentation of his new system by introducing listeners and readers to Schmidt, and his diffidence in pursuing the matter, did comport with larger patterns that saw race management survive, and even expand, in the early years of the era of scientific management. In short, and tellingly, race was much discussed but seldom systematically investigated at the higher reaches of management theory even as race management was practiced daily by foremen with little recourse to theory. As David Montgomery has written of the period in which scientific management flowered, "all managers seem[ed] to agree" with International Harvester's H. A. Worman that "each race has aptitude for certain kinds of work," though Montgomery slyly—and as we shall see, weightily—adds that they could disagree utterly about "which

'race' was best for what." Montgomery further observed that the trend toward personnel management as a complement to Taylorism specifically "extended the purview of scientific management from the factory itself to the surrounding community," a development that "flowed directly from the concern with recruiting from specific ethnic groups."¹⁴

Montgomery was right about both the ubiquity and durability of race management on the one hand and its haphazardness about which races performed best in what jobs on the other. Race was said to matter enormously in slotting workers into jobs, but the evidence on this decisive managerial decision was fully offhand, describing rather than studying practices. In 1915 an iron industry journal went so far as to challenge the adequacy of the very term "common labor" on the grounds that "such labor is racial," so that iron and steel actually did not compete in recruiting employees with other branches of industry. "Immigrants of some races," it continued, "turn chiefly to agriculture, some to the vending of fruit, others to the making of clothing, and others seek the coke works, blast furnaces and steel mills." At rare times, management literature specified which races should be slotted into which jobs. John Williams, who presided over the Philadelphia Association for the Discussion of Labor Problems, wrote during World War I that in fabricating, men grinding steel ought to be "Polish, Lithuanians or Americans." Finishers were to be Italian or American girls (and, or perhaps therefore, "not flirty") and forgers either Americans or "American Poles." The psychologist Elliott Frost declared race and nationality the centerpieces of personnel management and added this seat-of-the-pants science: "The Jew, for instance, demands an arrangement in which he can bargain. He is continually thinking of how much he is receiving for his labor. . . . The Italian's highly emotional nature lends itself readily to directions by the organizers. It is the testimony of the executives that he cannot be trusted without reservations, and that he is apt to be sullen and moody. The German workman is of placid disposition, loves detail, is particularly effective on precision work. The Pole and Croat usually do the dirty work in the plant."¹⁵

A chart elaborately ranking three dozen immigrant races according to their fitness for three dozen job types and conditions, posted at Pittsburgh Central Tube in 1925, assembled a much more impressive number of opinions, but only opinions, systematizing a huge factory and the peoples in it in upward of a thousand multicolored squares. Here again judgments were extremely crude, gathering up managerial and professional folklore and summing up existing prejudices and practices. Italians, according to the Pittsburgh chart, allegedly excelled with pick and shovel but could not handle serving as helpers for engineers. Armenians ranked "good" in none of the twenty-two job

categories listed and rose to fair only once: wheelbarrow. "Americans, White" could do any job fairly well and excelled in most. Jews supposedly fit well into no industrial jobs. Portuguese workers rated as poor in seven of eight "atmospheric conditions" and joined Mexicans in lacking capacity to work on the night shift, or the first shift. Greeks and West Indians rose beyond fair only in surviving heat and humidity according to the Pittsburgh chart.¹⁶

In 1911, *The Immigration Commission Report* posited near unanimity among employers in the judgment that South Italians were "the most inefficient of races." Nonetheless, Pittsburgh Steel management placed Italians in the most efficient third, above Canadians, of all "racial" groups shortly thereafter. Nor did the fact that one steel manager might prefer "two Negroes" to "three Macedonians," while most ranked the "alien white races" above African Americans in making ratios of productivity provoke any urgent desire to systematically settle the issue. Not only the basic question of who was White, but even that of who was Black, remained unanswered by managers otherwise fixated on race. "The 'black races' cannot do the work in three days that a white man can do in one," an Iron Range mine superintendent told a government investigator, using the former term to connote Montenegrins, Serbs, South Italians, Greeks, and Croats. When rankings were hazarded, they reflected collections of existing prejudices of managers, not investigation of production. Thus a 1911 *Iron Age* article placed the races in "about the following order: Slovaks, Poles, Magyars, Croats, Italians," ranked according to "preferences of the employers."¹⁷

Even the two most noteworthy efforts to provide social science and economic justifications for employing more African American workers in industry showed the ways in which wishful thinking and the anecdotal stood in for data and post-hoc reasoning in writing on race directed to managers. The best compilation of pro-Black-worker managerial opinion, a 1927 article by the eminent African American sociologist Charles Johnson, remained sufficiently wedded to gathering managers' opinions that Johnson ultimately acknowledged the limits set on his work as an instrument of reform. The litany of favorable opinion Johnson found among at least some managers was useful: "loyalty," "they follow instructions," "they are steady husky workers," "can stand heat," "can do hard work," "possess physical strength," and "are trustworthy." But the litany carried its own limits. Black workers were, Johnson wrote, "wanted for rough work because they are 'husky' and 'cheerful,' and fitting satisfactorily into this, it follows in reasoning that in the division of work they are best fitted for rough work, and frequently are held to it by a carefully reasoned process. Their success in one field thus limits prospects for advancement into others."¹⁸

In 1918, Dwight Thompson Farnam's long, hands-on *Industrial Management* article "Negroes as a Source of Industrial Labor" saw a leading supervising engineer develop some new evidence beyond managerial common sense while remaining in many ways more trapped even than Johnson by its assumptions. While Johnson entered the terrain of managerial opinion to push for racial justice, Farnam took up questions of race out of concern for profit. He made the case that the supply of Black labor doubled that of immigrant labor and its being "properly allocated" held the key to efficient management. The context of wartime labor shortages and the stirrings of immigrant labor rebellions made Farnam's article exceedingly well timed. Farnam moved perhaps more than any expert toward an empirical framework to investigate race and labor. He generated a plethora of graphs that liberally describing the "inherited" differences of African Americans as derived from climate in Africa and thus subject to gradual race development with proper White managerial leadership. But even so, in sum the article compiled rather than investigated managerial White lore about race on the job and echoed White supremacist assumptions generally. Describing the Great Migration to the North for war work as "trainloads of negro mamies, pickaninnies [with their] . . . pathetic paraphernalia of mysterious bundles and protesting household pets," Farnam compared Black and immigrant workers at every turn—their relative progress toward literacy, their rates of incarceration, and their reputations among foremen. But he also developed an extended history and natural history of Africa as one "country," without "letters, art or science," with venomous snakes and diseases preventing herding everywhere, and above all with "luxuriant" food, "fit for kings," there for the picking. Such misinformation became an explanation for the absence of any "feverish desire to work" among those more than a century removed from Africa. What plenty could not establish in blunting a work ethic was accounted for by the "humid heat [that is] depressing and exhausting," with Farnam believing that all of West Africa from Senegambia to Angola somehow lay below the equator.¹⁹

A subhead from Farnam maintained that "The Negro Is Different" as a subject of management, childlike and in need of a boss to think for him or her. In many ways the article reprised literature on slave management, pronouncing on the whole "negro race" and urging the individual choices of loyal, talented, and exemplary Black workers. The foreman was described much as an overseer, needing a combination of "absolute firmness" and an ability to see the African American workers' "antics at first with assumed toleration." Such talents were themselves racialized. The Irish, with their "cheeriness coupled with an occasional terrifying outburst of authority," typically "ma[d]e good

negro bosses." One anecdote suggested an Irish foreman can extract as much production from "an engine room full of negroes" as from one "full of German square-heads." The "type of Scot or New Englander who has no patience with any except those thrifty souls who work unwatched from a strong sense of duty, has no business trying to handle negroes."²⁰

Farnam kept his article's ill-described charts at some distance from his textual explanations of their contents. Four of the nine charts purport to quantify "negro" productivity under various types of foremen. Each type had a sample size of one; thus one foreman studied was Irish, lending the most slender support to Farnam's thesis on nationality and foremanship. Other charts and parts of the text did suggest where a serious quantitative study of race and productivity might have gone, comparing Black, Italian, and "mixed gang" productivity and even developing data on the merits of "seasonal racial employment" in which Black workers would return south for cotton harvest, to be replaced during parts of the year by southern Europeans. Farnam also, and contradictorily, broached a discussion of the desirability of providing infrastructure to keep Black families near factories in order to decrease turnover, a strategy Will Jones has detailed as a growing trend in the postwar wood products industry. But these lines in Farnam add up to less than a page of a long study.²¹

Thus purportedly objective studies of race and productivity remained crude in the extreme. This very crudeness turns out to be vital for understanding how race management worked. The most solid studies of immigrant workers surveyed their conditions off the job, teaching readers in 1921, for example, that only one Greek male immigrant in five and one Spanish immigrant in seven brought family members to the United States and tabulating their naturalization rates. The weightiest research on productivity and race tended to be assembled by investigators writing in the government journal *Monthly Labor Review*, and they often focused on demonstrating the falsity of negative stereotypes of Black workers. This data seems to have made scant impact against such stereotypes, while the repetition of anti-Black and xenophobic folklore took scholars to great academic heights. When the towering figure in U.S. sociology E. A. Ross urged slotting the Slavic "race" into filthy and unhealthy jobs because they were "immune" to dirt, he offered an opinion, not a study. Just the same should be said of Commons's own assessments, such as "The Negro . . . works three days and loafs three [while the] Chinaman, Italian, or Jewish immigrant works six days and saves the wages of three." Such chatter, not close and nuanced study, left on-the-ground race management, mostly by foremen, free to proceed on its own, often very local, assumptions. The sociologist Jerome Davis's 1922 study *The*

Russian Immigrant had to drop plans for a questionnaire on Russian immigrant workers as one personnel department after another reported utter lack of basic statistical information on how many Russian immigrants they employed and an inability to disentangle their profile from Jews, Poles, Finns, and others often listed as Russian. This lack of data coexisted with a high tide in pronounced racial judgments on workers and with a professed desire to limit hiring Russians, seen as potential Bolsheviks.²²

Some experts were aware of this pattern. As early as 1913, Hugo Münsterberg's classic *Psychology and Industrial Efficiency* identified the discontinuity between precise studies of workers' motions and seat-of-the-pants assumptions on "race" and productivity. Münsterberg set out to assess how far scientific management had gone, and could go, and staked out a place for "scientific psychology" as congruent with the "revolutionary," but incomplete, innovations of Taylor. Race initially seemed to Münsterberg to present little difficulty in achieving such a synthesis. "If a man applies for a position," he wrote, "he is considered [for] the totality of his qualities, and at first nobody cares whether the particular feature is inherited or acquired, whether it is an individual chance variation or . . . common . . . to all members of a certain nationality or race." Reliance on race in the search for the "best possible man" for the job would be checked because even when the "combination of mental traits" required occurred in specific races because "psychical qualities may vary strongly in the midst of the group."²³

But in further developing his analysis, Münsterberg acknowledged that the search for the best man for the job did often devolve into unexamined racial assumptions. That management at the plant level cared about race was not necessarily bad in his view, but that they cared so unsystematically and unscientifically clearly was troubling. At one factory with twenty nationalities the employment officers might declare the Italians best for one job, the Irish for another, and the Hungarians for a third. At the next factory, he added, completely different conclusions would be reached. In one workplace, managerial race lore had the "hasty and careless" Italians and Greeks as undesirable in risky jobs, which were to go to the Irish. In the next, it was the Irish who were too prone to court danger to do risky work. Münsterberg himself was no critic of race thinking—he tended to credit the stereotype of carelessness as applying to Italians, Greeks, and Irishmen. But he abhorred the lack of system in studying race and management. "American industrial centers," he argued, offered "extremely favorable conditions for the comparative study of nationality," but the opportunity was not being seized. "Much more thorough statistical inquiries," especially into nationality and responses to piece rates, were needed to ground "race psychological statements."²⁴

Münsterberg was joined in this lament by practically all of the small number of writers attempting to study race, management, and labor. Farnam noted in 1918 that "the racial tendencies of different classes of labor have so far been insufficiently studied in America." A year later the industrial psychologist Elliott Frost likewise thought that he was starting from scratch in developing an "analysis of racial psychology" appropriate to industrial education and management. As one early 1920s management handbook phrased Montgomery's point on race and personnel management, the duties of the employment manager included "follow[ing] internal migrations of different races and nationalities . . . movements of negroes and Spanish-Americans," and to hire the "type of worker most desirable for [the] task: American or foreign, white or black." But management literature remained very close-mouthed and contradictory on just how to do so.²⁵

The fit among immigrants' attributes, their potential for race development, and the needs of industry were at other junctures much more rapturously described, in often fanciful ways that hard data comparing immigrant "races" would have almost certainly undermined. The management and industry journal *Iron Age* linked new immigrants from eastern and southern Europe to not only the ability to withstand heat, but to an "attraction" to "hot and heavy work"—in contrast to the Northern European "aversion" to such conditions. Mexicans, according to a 1930 account in *Nation's Business*, "are fond of outdoor life [and] easily enter a nomadic mode of living" making them almost "natural" farmworkers. Other serendipities that management publications posited included Slavs having a "temperamental tendency toward being easily managed," toward being antiunion, and toward preferring "the lowest wage scale" to any extra effort. At least that was the story until Slavic American militancy in the post-World War I mass strikes strained such assumptions.²⁶

Ford English School's graduation ceremony paraded evidence of the easy path to race development that was imagined, alongside nativist fears, in the hopeful moments before World War I and the strike wave that followed changed matters. The ceremony saw immigrant workers in "shabby rags" walk down a gangplank connected to the image of an ocean liner and into a huge cauldron. The script labeled them with the racial slur "hunkie" as they entered the cauldron to, as a 1916 account in *Ford Times* put it, "see what the melting pot will do for them." After teachers from the school ladled vigorously, race development occurred and graduates emerged in "neat suits" as Americans. Workers entered the melting pot as "Irish-Americans" or "German-Americans" but, according to the company, they emerged as just Americans, "having learned to view the hyphen as a minus sign."²⁷

At its almost providential extremes, even after the race-based immigration restrictions of 1924, faith in immigrant race development by U.S. workplaces was one factor obviating any need for close investigation of immigrants in production. Thus, in a 1930 article the steel industry became "The Beast That Nurtures Children." The "fabrication of metal," it argued, pushed up successive waves of Irishmen, "dark Sicilians," and Slavic "hunkies" both "spiritually" and "materially," quickly freeing them from hard millwork so that even Slavs were supposedly gone from the plants by the time the article was written, all of them "foremen or assistant superintendents," if not self-employed. On this fanciful view, which reminds us how thoroughly race development coexisted with "playing one race against the other," it was time for the "uplifting forces of steel" to work their magic on "the last of the steel immigrants—southern negroes and Mexicans." In an industry like steel, management's institution of what Katherine Stone calls "minutely graded job ladders" enabled experts to point to acquisition of skills—albeit skills easily learned in a few weeks—to make a case for the racial development of White new immigrants. One industry leader connected the rise of the semiskilled machine tender to the development of White independence, using the language of an older labor system. Writing in *Iron Age*, the rubber manufacturing executive Charles R. Flint held that "The American wage earner is raised to the dignity of an overseer, not over degraded humanity, but over a more reliable and effective slave—machinery." Since African Americans, immigrants of color, and Jews were often excluded from working with machines, their slavishness was reiterated.²⁸

Race mattered, but largely unreflectively, in postwar management theory. Ordway Tead, the coauthor in 1920 of the first textbook in the new field of personnel management, introduced his *Instincts in Industry* with the remark that "differences in race, climate and civilization . . . may so modify human organisms as to cause radical differences in what is the substance of our . . . human nature." Tead wrote of "employers who have a definite policy of hiring several different nationalities in one department of a factory in order that workers may be less able to communicate effectively and therefore less able to cause trouble." For Tead, that deliberate divisiveness focused, as in the Mr. Block cartoon, on keeping out unions. But he offered neither an investigation of how or whether such a strategy worked, nor of his contention that the southern and eastern European immigrants commonly exhibited an "instinct" to be submissive, albeit punctuated by the occasional "brave frenzy of self-assertion." In 1920, when the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) "mapped" the field of industrial relations, enumerating far more than a hundred disciplines poised to contribute to the new field, it set for anthro-

pologists the task of investigating "inherited racial characteristics" capable of "affecting work," offering the "alleged laziness of the negro" as an example. But the SSRC did not set out to solve the problem of, to use Montgomery's phrasing, "which 'race' was best for what."²⁹

By the beginning of immigration restriction, many more social scientists joined Münsterberg in ridiculing the lack of system in investigating the productivity of various "races." They saw such imprecision as the irrational underside of an avowedly rational industrial society. As the old opportunities to manage by race and nationality gave way in the face of world war and the immigration restriction legislation of 1921 and 1924, retaining and even Americanizing immigrant workers came to be seen as more critical than dividing them. Commons's remark that "when immigration suddenly stops we see a human being in those who are here and begin to ask them what they want" overstated the change grossly. So too did the assertion by the historian of social science and industry Loren Baritz, who wrote that after the 1924 restrictions, and in tight labor markets, second-generation immigrants labored in transformed workplaces: "The dictatorial foremen with whom their parents had had to contend lost ground to a whole new system of personnel techniques." Postwar race riots in industrial districts reminded industry that managing racial competition could be tricky business. What Chad Pearson has written of as the model identified with the open-shop city of Worcester, Massachusetts, gained sway. There, and well beyond there, "engineers, open-shoppers, and Americanizers were chiefly interested in reducing workplace discord and overseeing 'friendly, 'spirited' workplaces."³⁰

But discord was far from simply abjured. Insofar as it is true that the unevenly developing trend toward personnel management identified the problem of labor turnover with what Sanford Jacoby calls "the foremen's hire and fire approach," it did undermine the most potent material way in which the races were set against each other in daily managerial practice. However, since Jacoby adds that "the vast majority" of workplaces retained the "foremen's drive system" throughout the 1920s, and since the "tight labor markets lasted only five years after 1924," the extent and pace of change should not be exaggerated. Indeed, although it is beyond the scope of this article, the successes of industrial unions in the 1930s almost certainly were more decisive in limiting race management on the shop floor than was the rise of a human relations approach to management in the 1920s.³¹

The decline of immigration certainly did open space for questioning race management's basis in science and considering its contours and staying power in a post-1924 labor market. By 1926, questions of race and management were already being cast by the pioneering personnel management textbooks as

likely to devolve in future into a focus on African American and Mexican workers. Commenting on the 1920s and 1930s, the management experts Herman Feldman and T. J. Woofter rued the fact that manufacturers, so scrupulously careful in choosing raw materials, "rely on hearsay and rumor as to the grades of labor hired." Everett C. Hughes and Helen M. Hughes observed that off-the-cuff opinions on racial difference so pervaded managerial choices and language, while hard data comparing racial performance remained so rare, that it was worth questioning whether "modern society is really guided by the impersonal concepts of the market and efficiency in choosing . . . its labor force." Taylor had written, "Under scientific management arbitrary power . . . ceases; and every single subject . . . becomes the question for scientific investigation." Where race was concerned, post-1924 experts rightly joined Münsterberg in arguing, such a shift did not happen.³²

The Schmidt examples, Montgomery's commentary, and the broader evidence before us show that scientific management and race management coexisted because they were not so utterly different after all. Scientific management was, as Bernard Doray wrote long ago, a "science" that could not escape "bear[ing] the scars of the social violence that characterized the society that gave birth to it." Replete with promanagement assumptions, it selectively drew on folk knowledge and crude observations of existing work patterns in ways mercilessly unearthed in Harry Braverman's dissection of Taylor's methods. Scientific management was therefore broadly compatible with that other great scar-bearing, scar-causing science of the early twentieth century—the elaboration of racial hierarchies.³³ Even attempts like those of Woofter and Feldman to cast race management as the exception to the general rationality of industry underlined the staying power of unscientific systems. Critics vacillated between ridiculing race management and calling for making its invidious race-based distinctions more scientifically systematic. The deep roots of the practice of race management, as detailed above, go some distance to explaining its impressive durability. But to emphasize only such history leaves us in danger of seeing management by race as residual, even premodern, and therefore at odds with the longer rational logic of capitalism. Rather, it has been central to such logic.

The staying power of what has been called the "foremen's empire" in the face of scientific management might be considered a triumph of one form of capitalist rationality intimately linked to deploying the irrationalities of race in order to manage labor. It is in this specific realm that Commons's remarks again become critical. As early as 1904, Commons heard from an employment agent at Swift and Company that the playing of races against each other had been systematized in his factory, which rotated favored racial

groups week by week. Commons worried that such "competition of races," especially when it included workers from the "non-industrial" Negro race and too many immigrants from the "backwards, shiftless and unintelligent races" of southern and eastern Europe and elsewhere, would lead to catastrophe for workers. But he recognized that competition extracted productivity as well as exerted a downward pressure on wages. Commons regarded these same packinghouses as also among the most systematized workplaces extant where the labor process was concerned. Even "the animal was laid off and surveyed like a map," he wrote, and moving line innovations engineered efficiency and speedups. Systems of modern management and race management lived cheek by jowl in the most advanced factories.³⁴

Such a system of racial competition did not rest on fixing a scientific chart of hierarchy but on the production, mostly by first-line management, of a series of contradictory and volatile hierarchical managerial opinions. The sociologist Niles Carpenter found workers thinking that lower management's racial prejudices and slights often weighed heaviest on immigrant workers, and Feldman's research suggested that they were exactly right. Farnam's brief for the inclusion of Black workers in industry likewise identified the foreman as the key figure on whose personality, racial knowledge, prejudices, style, and nationality all attempts to thus open the workplace turned. In establishing his credentials at the outset of his article, Farnam's early experience as a foreman is to be duly noted. Since foremen tended to retain the ability to hire and fire in the 1920s in the face of challenges from personnel managers, great weight lay behind their prejudices, which could keep racialized workers productively on edge. Indeed, on the rare occasion when the adequacy of the racial knowledge possessed by foremen was directly questioned by management experts, the framing of the issue was likely to be around the fear that the races were being too much pitted against each other with the fear, especially after the wave of racial terror during and after World War I, that lower management would appear unsympathetic and foster racial and national hatreds and riots.³⁵

If, as Doray has written, scientific management involved at times a "rational madness," management also long deployed the seeming irrationalities of race in a calculating manner. Sometimes it did so by fixing categories and hierarchies, more often by leaving races not fixed in set and studied rankings and thus permanently in competition and flux, at lower management's whim.³⁶ A brutally logical system kept immigrants' positions in play—and in the cases of African Americans often kept them out of jobs via color bars and by judging their fitness as a reserve army of labor. Historians have long known that Taylorism and other revolutionary changes in management theory often

supplemented, rather than supplanted, the "drive system" tactics in which lower management bullied and threatened workers.³⁷ But we have too often forgotten Commons's suggestion that the hurrying and pushing could be inflected by playing races against each other and thus wrongly separated industrial management from its coercive, racialized predecessors.

The great revolutionary optimism that Riebe exhibited in the "Mr. Block" cartoon beginning this essay hinged on trusting that effective organization could overcome management's divisive racial games. But his strip also showed the formidable extent to which race thinking powerfully contributed to management, both by creating competition for jobs and thereby lowering wages, and also by setting workers against each other every hour they were on the job. When the Irish worker responded to the boss by affirming "I can lick the whole bunch and I can make them work too," he showed at once the ways in which race management encouraged laborers to bring their cultural differences and stereotypes to work, the extent to which employers' appeals to race often overlapped with appeals to masculinity, and to the desire of some immigrant workers to ascend into the lower ranks of race management. Race management's powerful appeals dragged workers toward narrow "caste and craft unionism," which often brought union members together as Whites and as "citizens," but less frequently challenged race thinking by uniting all workers. Far from reducing labor to abstract and raceless inputs into the labor process, capital and management helped to reproduce racial differences over long stretches of U.S. history and to divide workers in ways that compromised labor's efforts to address either race or class inequalities. At the same time, the tremendous importance in the U.S. context of broad industrial union organization in challenging divisions not only of skill but also of race is elucidated by the stories this article tells. And finally, when so much of U.S. production is again, and in some ways still, predicated on "playing one race against the other"—and adding legality, citizenship, language, religion, and nationality into the mix—in order to weaken unions and to extract production in degrading and often dangerous jobs ranging from meatpacking to hotel and restaurant labor, from sex work to picking fruits and vegetables, and from sweatshops to supplying the U.S. army, this is a past very much with us.

Notes

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1. John R. Commons, *Races and Immigrants in America* (New York: Macmillan, 1907), 150; Chris Nyland, "Taylorism, John R. Commons, and the Hoxie Report," *Journal of Economic Issues* 30 (December 1996), 985–1016. See also Yngve Ramstad and James L. Starkey, "The Racial Theories of John R. Commons," *Research in the History of Economic Thought and Methodology* 13 (1995), 1–75. The cartoon is included in Ernest Riebe, *Mr. Block: Twenty-Four IWW Cartoons*, ed. Franklin Rosemont (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr, 1984), unpaginated. For the context, see David Roediger, *Towards the Abolition of Whiteness: Essays on Race, Politics, and Working Class History* (London: Verso, 1994), 143–45; and Michael Cohen, "Cartooning Capitalism: Radical Cartooning and the Making of American Popular Radicalism in the Early Twentieth Century," *International Review of Social History* 52 (2007), 35–58.

2. On the dating of the origins of management, see Daniel Nelson, *Managers and Workers: Origins of the Twentieth-Century Factory System in the United States, 1880–1920* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1996), 50. For "scientifically," see *Advice among Masters: The Ideal in Slave Management in the Old South*, ed. James O. Breeden (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1980), esp. 44; and R. Keith Aufhauser, "Slavery and Scientific Management," *Journal of Economic History* 33 (December 1973): 811–24. Commons on scientific management as quoted in Samuel Haber, *Efficiency and Uplift: Scientific Management in the Progressive Era, 1890–1920* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), 148. For Marx and the capitalist personality, see Karl Marx, *Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations* (New York: International, 2000), 118.

3. Ken Lawrence, "Karl Marx on American Slavery" at <http://www.sojournertruth.net/marxslavery.pdf>; "Marx to Sigfrid Meyer and August Vogt in New York" (9 April 1870) at http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1870/letters/70_04_09.htm; Theodore Allen, *The Invention of the White Race: Racial Oppression and Social Control* (New York: Verso, 1994); George Rawick, *From Sundown to Sunup: The Making of the Black Community* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1973); C. L. R. James, "The Atlantic Slave Trade and Slavery: Some Interpretations of Their Significance in the Development of the United States and the Western World," in *Amistad 1: Writings on Black History and Culture*, ed. John A. Williams and Charles F. Harris (New York: Random House, 1970), 119–64; Ronald Bailey, "The Slave(ry) Trade and the Development of Capitalism in the United States," in *The Atlantic Slave Trade: Effects on Economies, Societies, and Peoples in Africa, the Americas, and Europe*, ed. J. E. Inikori and Stanley Engerman (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1992), 205–46; Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (Washington, DC: Howard University Press, 1981); W. E. B. Du Bois, *Black Reconstruction in America 1860–1880* (New York: Free Press, 1988). For an important account of the absence of U.S. slavery from histories of management, see Bill Cooke, "The Denial of Slavery in Management Studies," *Journal of Management Studies* 40 (December 2003), 1895–1918.

4. Among the best works within labor history are Alexander Saxton, *The Indispensable Enemy: Labor and the Anti-Chinese Movement in California* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975); and Moon-Kie Jung, *Reworking Race: The Making of*

Hawaii's Interracial Labor Movement (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006); on the New South, see Brian Kelly, *Race, Class, and Power in the Alabama Coalfields, 1908-21* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2001); Gerald David Jaynes, *Branches without Roots: Genesis of the Black Working Class in the American South, 1862-1882* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); and Joe Trotter, *Coal, Class, and Color: Blacks in Southern West Virginia, 1915-1932* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1990). Other debts to labor history, and particularly to David Montgomery, appear throughout the notes in this chapter, though the field has been slow to consider race management beyond the South and to connect histories of slavery to later patterns of management.

5. Karl Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*, vol. 1 (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr, 1906), 185-330; Harry Braverman, *Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the 20th Century* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975); Antonio Gramsci, "Americanism and Fordism," *Selections from the Prison Notebooks* (New York: International, 1971), 279-318. See also James, *American Civilization*, ed. Anna Grimshaw and Keith Hart (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1993), 173-79 (on Ford) and 181-85.

6. Lisa Lowe, *Immigrant Acts: On Asian American Cultural Politics* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996), esp. 27-28. See also Karen Brodtkin, "Global Capitalism: What's Race Got to Do with It?" *American Ethnologist* 27 (2000), 238-56, esp. 239-40.

7. Cheryl Harris, "Whiteness as Property," *Harvard Law Review* 106 (1993), 1709-95. See also George Rawick, *From Sundown to Sunup: The Making of the Slave Community* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1972), 125-60.

8. David R. Roediger and Elizabeth D. Esch, *The Production of Difference: Race and the Management of Labor in U.S. History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).

9. Richard Williams, *Hierarchical Structures and Social Value: The Creation of Black and Irish Identities in the United States* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

10. Frederick Winslow Taylor, *Principles of Scientific Management* (New York: Norton, 1967, originally 1911), 41-47; Robert Kanigel, *The One Best Way: Frederick Winslow Taylor and the Enigma of Efficiency* (New York: Viking, 1997), 319 ("Hungarians") and 316-22; Haber, *Efficiency and Uplift*, 23, n. 12, on "Patrick."

11. W. E. B. Du Bois, *The Philadelphia Negro: A Social Study*, ed. E. Digby Baltzell (New York: Schocken, 1967, originally 1899), 129 and xxxvii-xxxviii and 129-31; Taylor, "Answer to Criticism of Mr. Upton Sinclair (1911?)" in the Frederick Winslow Taylor Papers at Stevens Institute of Technology Archives in Hoboken, New Jersey [hereafter Taylor Papers], and online at <http://stevens.cdmhost.com/cdm4/document.php?CISROOT=/p41000coll1&CISOPTR=255&REC=2>; for Taylor on drinking and ethnicity at Midvale, see "Taylor to Willard Price" (17 September 1914) in Taylor Papers and at <http://stevens.cdmhost.com/cdm4/document.php?CISROOT=/p41000coll1&CISOPTR=1245&REC=3>. On Midvale, Du Bois, and Taylor, see Jacqueline Jones, "'Lifework' and Its Limits: The Problem of Labor in The Philadelphia

Negro," in W. E. B. DuBois, *Race, and the City: The Philadelphia Negro and Its Legacy*, ed. Michael B. Katz and Thomas J. Sugrue (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), esp. 108-9; and Walter Licht, *Getting Work: Philadelphia, 1840-1950* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000), 46-47. On "nigger driver," Taylor as extracted in Frank Barkley Copley, *Frederick W. Taylor: Father of Scientific Management*, 2 vols. (New York: Augustus Kelley, 1969, originally 1923), 1: 163.

12. Haber, *Efficiency and Uplift*, 23, n. 12, including the quotation. Kanigel, *One Best Way*, 35-44, treats Taylor's abolitionist upbringing and his adult suspicion of antislavery motives.

13. For a vivid example of Taylor undermining the foremen's day-to-day control over individual workers, see "Taylor to Charles Morse" (20 May 1907) in <http://stevens.cdmhost.com/cdm4/document.php?CISROOT=/p41000coll1&CISOPTR=1547&REC=3>, where he approves having an individual worker "taught" by eight foremen severely.

14. David Montgomery, *The Fall of the House of Labor: The Workplace, the State, and American Labor Activism, 1865-1925* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 242-43. See also Sanford M. Jacoby, "A Century of Human Resource Management," in *Industrial Relations to Human Resources and Beyond: The Evolving Process of Employee Relations Management*, ed. Bruce E. Kaufman, Richard A. Beaumont, and Roy B. Helfgott (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2003), 148-50.

15. "The Iron Industry's Labor Supply," *Iron Age* 96 (8 July 1915), 91; John M. Williams, "An Actual Account of What We Have Done to Reduce Our Labor Turnover," *Annals of the American Academy* 71 (May 1917), 64; Elliott Frost, "What Industry Wants and Does Not Want from the Psychologist," *Journal of Applied Psychology* 4 (March 1920), 21-22.

16. John Bodnar, Roger Simon, and Michael Weber, *Lives of Their Own: Blacks, Italians, and Poles in Pittsburgh, 1900-1960* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1983); p. 240 reprints the chart.

17. David R. Roediger, *Working toward Whiteness: How America's Immigrants Became White; The Strange Journey from Ellis Island to the Suburbs* (New York: Basic Books, 2005), 75-77; for the Iron Range, "Industrial Progress and Efficiency," in vol. 16, pt. 18, "Iron Ore Mining," in *Reports of the Immigration Commission, Immigrants in Industries: Senate Documents, 61st Congress, 2nd Session 1909-1910*, vol. 78 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1911), 339-41, with thanks to Thomas Mackaman; Lauck, "Recent Immigration," 899. For Commons's ranking of European immigrants, partly based on class consciousness, see "The Sweating System in the Clothing Trade" in Commons, ed., *Trade Unionism and Labor Problems*, 332-33. On uses of race to refer to European groups later thought of as "ethnic," see Victoria Hattam, *In the Shadow of Race: Jews, Latinos, and Immigrant Politics in the United States* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).

18. Charles S. Johnson, "How the Negro Fits in Northern Industries," *Industrial Psychology* 1 (June 1926), 408, with thanks to Zach Sell.

19. Dwight Thompson Farnam, "Negroes as a Source of Industrial Labor," *Industrial Management* (August 1918), 123-29.

20. Ibid. On humidity and heat, see also Griffith Taylor, "The Distribution of Future White Settlement: A World Survey Based on Physiographic Data," *Geographical Review* 12 (July 1922), 375-402; for work allowing for the possibility that "work curves" were not "racial," see, e.g., Thomas R. Garth, "Racial Differences in Mental Fatigue," *Journal of Applied Psychology* 4 (June-September, 1920), 235-44; and Garth, "White, Indian, and Negro Work Curves," *Journal of Applied Psychology* 5 (March 1921), 14-25.
21. Farnam, "Negroes as a Source," 123-29.
22. Hugh Reid, "Why Bar the Door to Labor?" *Nation's Business* 9 (January 1921), 31; Luther D. Burlingame, "Americanizing a Thousand Men," *Industrial Management* 53 (June 1917), 385-92; "The Southern Negro in Cleveland Industries," *Monthly Labor Review* 19 (July 1924), 41-44; "Negro Labor during and after the War," *Monthly Labor Review* 12 (April 1921), 853-58; "Working and Living Conditions of Negroes in West Virginia," *Monthly Labor Review* 21 (August 1925), 256-59; and esp. "Industrial Employment of the Negro in Pennsylvania," *Monthly Labor Review* 22 (June 1926), 48-51. Ross quoted in Stanley Lieberman, *A Piece of the Pie: Black and White Immigrants since 1880* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 25; Roediger, *Working toward Whiteness*, 54. Commons quoted in "Social and Industrial Problems," *The Chautauquan* 39 (March 1904), 18 and 13-22; Ramstad and Starkey, "Racial Theories of John R. Commons," esp. 16-17 and 63-64. On Russians, see Jerome Davis, *The Russian Immigrant* (New York: Macmillan, 1922), 23-25.
23. Hugo Münsterberg, *Psychology and Industrial Efficiency* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1913), 50, 27-28, and 69. On the origins of industrial psychology, see Loren Baritz, *The Servants of Power: A History of the Use of Social Science in American Industry* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965), 21-41.
24. Münsterberg, *Psychology and Industrial Efficiency*, 129-31.
25. Farnam, "Negroes as a Source," 128; Frost, "What Industry Wants"; Leon Pratt Alford, *Management's Handbook: By a Staff of Specialists* (New York: Ronald Press, 1924), 1462-63. See also Zach Sell, "A Jungle to Work In: Race and the Social Terrain of Foundry Production" (senior thesis, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2009).
26. "Strong Support for Selective Immigration," *Iron Age* 111 (January 11, 1923), 163; H. D. Minich, "The Value of Time Study," *100%: The Practical Magazine of Efficient Management* 1 (November 1913), 6. See also James Howard Bridge, *The Inside History of the Carnegie Steel Company: A Romance of the Millions* (New York: Aldine, 1903), 81; Karl De Laittre, "The Mexican Laborer and You," *Nation's Business* 18 (November 1930), 44ff; W. J. Lauck, "Recent Immigration: Its Significant Aspects to the Iron and Steel Industry," *Iron Age* 87 (13 April 1911), 898; "The Filipino Problem in California," *Monthly Labor Review* 30 (June 1930), 73-74; David Colcord, "A Beast That Nurtures Children," *Nation's Business* 18 (November 1930), 32-34 and 170-71; Frances A. Kellor, "Chambers of Commerce and Alien Workmen," *Nation's Business* 3 (December 1915), 18-20.
27. On the Ford English School, see Daniel M.G. Graff, "Ford Welfare Capitalism in Its Economic Context," in *Masters to Managers: Historical and Comparative Perspectives on American Employers*, ed. Sanford G. Jacoby (New York: Columbia

- University Press, 1991), 98 and (for the quote) 99. For "hunkie" (or "hunky"), see Roediger, *Working toward Whiteness*, 37-45. On melting pot and Ford, see Elizabeth Esch, "Fordtown: Managing Race and Nation in the American Empire, 1925-1945" (unpublished Ph.D. diss., New York University, 2004).
28. Frank Julian Warne and J. R. Commons, "Slavs in Coal Mining," in *Trade Unionism and Labor Problems*, ed. John R. Commons (Boston: Ginn, 1905), 346. See also "Mark Pittenger, 'What's on the Worker's Mind': Class Passing and the Study of the Industrial Workplace in the 1920s," *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences* 39 (Spring, 2003), 153. On steel, see Katherine Stone, "The Origins of Job Structures in the Steel Industry," in *Labor Market Segmentation*, ed. Richard C. Edwards, Michael Reich and David M. Gordon (Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, 1975), 49. Flint as quoted in Michael K. Rosenow, "Injuries to All: The Rituals of Dying and the Politics of Death among United States Workers, 1877-1910" (unpublished Ph.D. diss., University of Illinois, 2008), 26. On occupational color bars and machinery, see David Roediger, "Gaining a Hearing for Black-White Unity: Covington Hall and the Complexities of Race, Gender, and Class," in *Towards the Abolition of Whiteness*, 154 and 162-63. See also Amy L. Fairchild, *Science at the Borders: Immigrant Medical Inspection and the Shaping of the Modern Industrial Labor Force* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 219 and 191-220.
29. Ordway Tead, *Instincts in Industry: A Study in Working-Class Psychology* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1918), pp. 13, 89-90, and 143; the "map" is reproduced in Bruce E. Kaufman's excellent *Origins and Evolution of the Field of Industrial Relations in the United States* (Ithaca, NY: ILR Press, 1993), 14-17.
30. Baritz, *Servants of Power*, 13; Jacoby, "Century of Human Resource Management," 149, 154, and 148-55; Roediger, *Working toward Whiteness*, 76, 216-20; John R. Commons, "Introduction to the Edition of 1920," in his *Races and Immigrants in America* (New York: Macmillan, 1920), xix. Chad Pearson, "Making the 'City of Prosperity': Engineers, Open-Shoppers, Americanizers, and Propagandists in Worcester, Massachusetts, 1900-1925," *Labor History* 45 (February 2004), 9-36; quotation on 26.
31. Jacoby, "Century of Human Resource Management," 154 and 148-55.
32. For the textbook, see Ordway Tead and Henry C. Metcalf, *Personnel Administration: Its Principles and Practice* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1926, originally 1920), 48; Everett Cherrington Hughes and Helen Macgill Hughes, *Where Peoples Meet: Ethnic and Racial Frontiers* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1952), 67; T. J. Woofter Jr., *Races and Ethnic Groups in American Life* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1933), 144; Reinhard Bendix, *Work and Authority in Industry: Ideologies of Management in the Course of Industrialization* (Edison, NJ: Transaction, 2001, originally 1974), 273 and 278; Nyland, "Taylorism, John R. Commons, and the Hoxie Report," 986. See also Nelson, *Managers and Workers*, 80-83.
33. Bernard Doray, *From Taylorism to Fordism: A Rational Madness* (London: Free Association, 1988), 83-84; and Braverman, *Labor and Monopoly Capital*, 104-23.
34. John R. Commons and others, *History of the Labour Movement in the United States*, 4 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1918-35), 3: xxv and 322-33, esp. 328 for Don

D. Lescohier's section on personnel management; Ramstad and Starkey, "The Racial Theories of John R. Commons," 16-18, quote Commons on the "competition of races"; John R. Commons, "Industry," *Chautauquan* 38 (February 1904), 533-43; Commons, "Social and Industrial Problems," 19 ("physical exertion") and 17-22; and Harold M. Baron, *The Demand for Black Labor: Historical Notes on the Political Economy of Racism* (Somerville, MA: New England Free Press, 1971). For the last Commons quote, and an apt discussion of the labor process in packing, see James R. Barrett, "Immigrant Workers in Early Mass Production Industry: Work Rationalization and Job Control Conflicts in Chicago's Packinghouses, 1900-1904," in *German Workers in Industrial Chicago*, ed. Hartmut Keil and John B. Jentz (De Kalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1983), 106 and 105-09. See also Rick Halpern, *Down on the Killing Floor: Black and White Workers in Chicago's Packinghouses, 1904-54* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1997), 23-24.

35. Herman Feldman, *Racial Factors in American Industry* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1931), 147; Niles Carpenter, *Nationality, Color, and Economic Opportunity in the City of Buffalo* (Westport, CT: Negro Universities Press, 1970), 118-30; Farnam, "Negroes as a Source," 123, 125, and 127-28; Fred H. Rindge Jr., "From Boss to Fore-Man," *Industrial Management*, 53 (July 1917), 511-12; Kaufman, *Origins and Evolution of the Field of Industrial Relations*, 15 and 17; and Tead and Metcalf, *Personnel Administration*, 48.

36. Doray, *From Taylorism to Fordism*, 83-84.

37. See esp. Roger Horowitz, "Negro and White, Unite and Fight": *A Social History of Industrial Unionism in Meatpacking, 1930-1990* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1997), 24-25 and 66; and Halpern, *Down on the Killing Floor*, 41-42 and 88-90.

2 "Free Shops for Free Men"?

The Challenges of Strikebreaking and Union-Busting in the Progressive Era

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Breaking strikes and busting unions has always been challenging, controversial, and messy work. At the beginning of the twentieth century, employers, the primary beneficiaries and frequent strategizers of union-fighting activities, usually found the tasks extraordinarily burdensome—and often hazardous. After all, they faced considerable obstacles from organized labor as well as from large sections of the general public, which often sided with struggling unionists in the context of labor disputes. Unionists and their leaders normally demanded the presence of closed shops—workplaces requiring that employees hold union membership as a condition for employment. They held that strikebreakers were responsible for driving down wages, undermining workplace standards, and threatening community harmony. Strikebreakers, union supporters routinely complained, placed their own short-term, narrow interests above the community's concerns. As a Topeka, Kansas, newspaper reported in 1898, "renegades and scabs" selfishly earned paychecks while protestors and their "families are starving for bread."¹

Union activists were seldom passive during industrial disputes. Many kept scrupulous lists of strikebreakers and frequently employed forms of coercion and intimidation against their working-class opponents. During an especially dramatic, thousand-person Albany, New York, transit strike in 1901, for example, irate protestors carried signs that read "Kill the Scabs!"² Writing about another group of strikebreakers in New Orleans during the following year, an Amalgamated Transit Union member scornfully called them "the scum of everything that is low, dirty, and contemptible."³ In union circles and beyond, practically no one occupied a lower position in society than the hated scab.